APPENDIX 1

Selections from Strauss's Notes on the *Euthyphro*

Note 1

S.'s piety is vouched for by an expert in piety—but E. is a fool
in addition, he is impious.
by his deed—but the deed is ambiguous.
→ his piety remains an open question

The speech → can a man be pious who does not know what piety is?
can any man be pious?
→ S. as well as all others are impious.
the critique of "what ἡ πόλις νομίζει [the city believes]"
→ S. is impious.
the ignorance of the gods
the πλάνη [wandering] regarding δίκαια [just things], καλά [noble things], ἀγαθά [good things]
→ knowing gods would not have any desires for δίκαια [just things], καλά [noble things], ἀγαθά [good things], because they would be self-sufficient.

Comments in square brackets [ ] are editorial insertions; those in angular brackets < > are notes crossed out by Strauss; those surrounded by superscript [V]'s have been inserted by Strauss on a verso page; those surrounded by superscript [P]'s have been inserted by Strauss in pencil; and those marked by a superscript [R] have been underlined by Strauss with red pencil.

Now, the ideas are higher than the gods and the ideas are accessible to ἐπιστήμη [knowledge]—ergo: if the gods are knowing, ὁμοίωσις θεῷ [assimilation to god], i.e. (since the gods are not pious) transcending piety.
→ S. is impious in his thought, but not λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ [in speech and in deed]

not ἔργῳ [in deed]: his advice to Euthyphro

not λόγῳ [in speech]: he keeps his knowledge to himself—he is not φιλάνθρωπος [philanthropic].

But this precisely <u>is</u> φιλανθρωπία [philanthropy] = justice = piety.

Note 2

S.'s φιλανθρωπία [philanthropy] consists, not in <u>teaching</u>, but in <u>questioning</u>, in cross-examining or perplexing others
—should <u>this</u> explain S.'s unpopularity? or is the explanation supplied in the *Apol.* doubtful?

<u>S.'s crime</u> his <u>injustice</u>

—he never attempts the <u>big</u> job of διώκειν ἄλλους [to prosecute others] (ad 3a2–5)

—he does not teach—he lacks φιλανθρωπία [philanthropy] (ad 3d6–9)

ad 5c4–8
ad 6a6–b6

his <u>justice</u>—his φιλανθρωπία [philanthropy]—he wants to prevent E. from committing what may well be a grave mistake.

The <u>constant</u> reference to E.'s wisdom and his unwillingness to divulge it—cf. ad 3d5–6—and E. openly boasts of his wisdom. Yet: S. boasts of his ἀμαθία [ignorance]—is <u>he</u> not the one who does not divulge his wisdom?

Note 3

cf. Xen. and *EN*.

ἀνθρώπινα ≠ μαθηματικά [human things ≠ mathematical things]

1) the former are essentially controversial so that even gods would fight with regard to them
2) the gods are concerned with the former and not with the latter
The solution:
a) the gods are not concerned with ἀνθρ. [human things], but with μαθημ. [mathematical things] (cf. 10d12–13)
b) mathematization of the ἀνθρώπινα [human things] etc.—cf. *Protag.* in fine.

the gods are concerned with ἀνθρ. [human things] qua μαθηματικά [mathematical things]

On what principle does S. act? Certainly not on a) and b)[1]—he remains within ἔνδοξα horizon [accepted opinion horizon]
—he suggests we do not know what ὅσιον [holy] is and therefore have to follow ἔνδοξα [accepted opinion].
He suggests that we just do not happen to know what τὸ ὅσιον [the holy] is, whereas possibly τὸ ὅσιον [the holy] is unknowable because it is essentially νόμῳ [by law]—or the fundamental infiniteness of our knowledge of ideas—?

Note 4

For summary of *Euthyphron*—with a view to *Theology and Politics*.[2]
The basic problem of philosophy—a) philosophy as matter of faith, not of insight—philosophy makes certain special assumptions—

cf. Nietzsche's critique of the philosophers—the decisive assumption is "necessity."

b) contingency at the bottom of necessity (cf. my notes to Shestov).

The need for philosophizing is more evident than the need for justice and piety. But why justice and piety?
Why justice? Justice = θεραπεία [τῶν] ἀνθρώπων [care of (the) human beings]

→ not teaching everyone everything one knows

→ φιλανθρωπία [philanthropy] → teaching everyone everything one knows.

The just man = he who knows to teach human beings = the ruler—he gives everyone what is due to him for the sake of preservation of πόλις [city]—ultimately for the sake of his own benefit (the philosopher lives in society) but S. derives no benefit: he is hated. Why? The limitation of his art and of all art: τύχη [chance]

<Why piety? Piety and τύχη [chance] cf. *Tim*. on τύχη [chance].

The understanding of τύχη [chance] by philosophy and the understanding of τύχη [chance] by piety.

τύχη [chance] cannot be controlled	τύχη [chance] can be controlled.

What leads to the view that τύχη [chance] can be controlled? ἀλαζονεία [boastfulness] or μανία [madness]. Denial of τύχη [chance] proper: no essential difference between ἕκαστα [particulars] and εἴδη [forms]—denial of εἴδη [forms]—gods would not be guided by knowledge—fighting and unjust gods—gods who can be bribed with sacrifices and presents—

The compromise view: wise and just gods concerned with man's justice—presupposes that the higher takes care of the lower without loving it –

Is the assertion of "negative ideas" not another form of expressing the denial of τύχη [chance] and of μὴ ὀν [nonbeing]?>

Note 5

Ad *Euthyphron*

—explain what denial of τύχη [chance] means for Platonic dialogue—

the philosopher is Socrates—all unessential features of Socrates, all ἴδια [peculiarities], are necessary with a view to his ἔργον [work].

his dialogue with Euthyphro = the dialogue of the philosopher with the expert in piety on piety.

E. happens to be a man of dubious piety → the expert in piety, at least the expert who is friendly to S, is necessarily a man of dubious piety.

Every good work of art is perfect—no τύχη [chance]—nothing can be added and nothing can be subtracted.

But the good work of imitative art communicates the intrinsic necessity to its subject matter—they commit the fundamental lie.

Note 6

Ad *Euthyphron*

the problem of the justice of the gods –

ἀγαθόν [good] = πάτριον [ancestral]—the ancestors the source of all blessings → the gods are good—why then is this denied by the myth? It does not suffice to say that the poets invented this theology –

The question of the first things—they are the causes of the evil as well—power rather than beneficence.

This must be integrated into my "deduction" of revelation –

the custom as way—our way = the right way—the right way = the ancestral way—the ancestors must be gods or sons of gods—the right way has its origin in the first things –

the first things are responsible for all other things—also for the evil things—the right way is devised precisely in order to cope with the evil things—in order to placate the gods.

The right or holy way as distinguished from the evil way—yet in the origin of the right or holy way, the distinction between holy and evil cannot be made—yet: the gods are models → destruction of morality.

Alternatives:

a) the gods are good קדשים תהיו כי קדוש אני [Leviticus 20:26: "Be holy because I am holy"]

b) holiness = pleasing the gods ≠ justice: the gods themselves are neither holy nor just—the gods are not good.

(a) does not account for evil—except if man is responsible for evil—or fallen angels—)

—but how do we know that the gods are good? τί ἐστι θεός [what is (a) god?]; a superior being—we know something of superiority among human beings, the σοφός [wise]—the σοφός [wise] is not evil—ergo, the gods will be still less evil.)

Problem of piety Piety = right attitude to the gods—but anthropomorphic gods are essentially hostile to each other → they are unjust → piety and justice are incompatible.

But what about non-anthropomorphic gods? No piety possible or required.

Above all: they would be just by participating of justice—hence be less just than αὐτόν το δίκαιον [the just itself].

Note 7

piety = awareness of the power of τύχη [chance].

piety = imitation of the gods = philosophy.

awareness of the power of τύχη [chance] is the proper substitute for philosophy and the only guarantee against ὕβρις [arrogance] or μανία [madness]. Men should ascribe all ἀγαθά [good things] to the gods and all κακά [bad things] to their own faults (*Rep*. II).

But this does not explain why the city must recognize gods?

The myth transforms the unpredictable τύχη [chance] which therefore provokes the gambler (*Republic* 374c), into the predictable action of the just gods—

Note 8

What is the justification of piety? Fear of the gods and sense of shame (= fear of bad reputation) = εὐσχημοσύνη [gracefulness]

Cf. 8c10, e1: οὐ τολμῶσι [do not dare] cf. EN on αἰδώς [sense of shame]

Since the philosophers do not have fear of gods, only fear of bad reputation remains.

What is the justification of piety? The view that piety consist in not imitating the old god is superior to the view that we shall imitate them.

But: it is preferable only on account of its practical consequences.
Yet: it is inconsistent as is shown by the argument in *Rep*. II.

Note 9

The ἔνδοξα [accepted opinions] presupposed by E.
a) the gods are concerned with δικαία [just things]—in order to be δίκαιοι [just], we have to follow their example—this is our knowledge of δικαία [just things]—(cf. Aristophanes alicubi [somewhere] on the gods as models of action—possibly note to Introduction ch. 4)
The gods fight each other? They contradict each other? But the highest god, the king's father, Zeus, has to be the model—and he is the model for E.
The revolutionary character of E.: he does not follow the example of human beings as told by the stories, but the example of God as told by stories. (Kinship between myth and philosophy.)
<The objections: 1) are the stories true? 2) how do we know that the authentic actions of Zeus are just? Only if we know what justice is—but if we know this, we would not need any stories.
b) Can we know what justice is? The explicitly controversial character →
  α) either we disregard it altogether and turn to mathematics
  β) or we try to reach mathematical knowledge of justice>
In the *Euthyphron*, S. does neither one nor the other—what he does is that he follows the non-mythical ἔνδοξον [accepted opinion] (honor the father)—the controversy is finished by δόξα πόλεως [opinion of the city]—(cf. the ambiguity of the controversy: it is not so much about the law as about the fact (cf. Ar. *Rhetoric*))
E. is impious because he does not follow the δόξα πόλεως [opinion of (the) city]—S. is pious because he follows it.
E. is impious because he follows Zeus (he harms the father)—S. follows Daedalus and harms the son (note that E. is younger than S.)
    → S. is impious too
    for he doubts the δόξα πόλεως [opinion of (the) city].
  Both are impious because they doubt the δόξα πόλεως [opinion of (the) city].
But E.'s doubt, because it is not radical, leads to action—S.'s doubt, because it is radical, does not lead to action—but is this correct?

Note 10

Why piety? We have seen (p. 12 Heft [notebook]) that "either ideas or gods"—which means that primacy of the gods, and hence piety, is due to ignorance. But this [is] no explanation why ignorance (of ideas) takes this particular direction, i.e. ascribing of guidance to gods?

We have therefore to go somewhat deeper.

In other words, we have shown that the assumption that the ultimate is arbitrary will, will not bound by any necessity independent of it, leads to absurdities (the one god may create other gods who also will do what they please → fight and impossibility of piety = pleasing the gods; he may kill himself and decree that the world would go on forever ruled by necessary laws).

The theistic (polytheistic or monotheistic) position stands and falls by admission of necessity at the bottom of arbitrariness.

Yet: why theistic position? if not rule of τύχη [chance] (Hesiod: first Chaos arises) Omnia quae sunt ex nihilo, de nihilo facta sunt.[3]

Now, if there is no necessity at the bottom of arbitrariness, everything is possible and nothing is impossible.

But: certain things are impossible—we all admit this—the doubt that they may be possible (e.g. that man is immortal) is a mere assertion if it is not shown that it is possible.

Generally: "first Chaos arises"—before it arose, it is possible—how? is it possible that something jumps into being out of nothing? is not space presupposed? empty space? But how can there arise something out of nothing?

If there is no necessity at the bottom of arbitrariness, there can be no knowledge, but only report, "history," i.e. myth.

Yet: the use of words (≠ proper names)—the universals which are understood

Necessity and prediction.

Now, if there is necessity at the bottom of arbitrariness, not everything is necessary—before S.'s trial, it was not necessary that he should be condemned—there are contingent things—things that are not determined in advance, which cannot be predicted: I may stand or sit—whether I will stand or sit, depends on circumstances which no one can foresee—I may

be in the habit of sitting—but, when I try to sit, the chair breaks down and no other chair is available—the chair breaks down because it has been overburdened; besides, the other chair usually available is in use elsewhere in the house—as far as my standing or sitting is concerned, my standing to-day is chance. On the basis of contingency, chance becomes possible. Chance as chance cannot be controlled.
(Philosophy = ideas ≠ ἕκαστα [particulars] → insight into necessity of unintelligible chance.)

Chance decides on the fate of the philosopher e.g.
Now, men rebel against this state of affairs: they want to control chance. Μαντική [divinatory art] (3b5–6, c1–3, e2–3)—S. does not attempt to find out what cannot be found out.[4] Ἀλαζονεία [boastfulness] and μανία [madness]. Denial of τύχη [chance] proper: no essential difference between ἕκαστα [particulars] and εἴδη [forms]—denial of εἴδη [forms]—the causes of all things are arbitrary beings—they are superhuman, i.e. their perfection is to be understood in the light of human perfection, but human perfection is to get what one wants → powerful and happy gods who do not know—fights and unjust gods—gods which can be bribed with sacrifices and prayers—[V](The compromise view: wise and just gods concerned with men: justice presupposes a) that justice is important to gods b) that the higher cares for the lower without loving it.)
Also: the myth transforms the unpredictable τύχη [chance] which therefore provokes the gambler into the predictable action of the just gods.[V]

Note 11

S. suggests to a fool that the best thing is to follow custom regarding piety –

a) it is doubtless best in the given case
b) it is doubtless best for this man and his type in general, because he is certainly unable to produce anything better than the custom –
c) it is best for all who do not know what piety is –
but S. himself does not know what piety is—is it knowable?
d) if S. knows what piety is and is knowingly pious, he concedes the difference between his piety and proper piety.
In other words: ignorance → refraining from action—such action is indispensable, based on νόμος [law]

> The possibility of action without knowledge: need for action—following the νόμος [law]—if the νόμος [law] proves to lead to manifest unpleasantness to the whole community, necessary changes.

Note 12

ad piety: piety is threatened by its justification (the myths = explanation why sacrifices and prayers are pleasing to the gods)—piety must be divorced from its justification—it becomes mere action

Note 13

It must be made perfectly clear that Socr. did not believe in the gods of the city.
Hence: the difference between the noble lie and the base lie
—the base lie: Socr.'s respect of popular religion because he was a religious man.
the noble lie: Socr. expels the lie from his soul—as ruthlessly as a Hobbes—
Athena and Zeus are merely products of imagination, and not of ruthless imagination—
but, he answers to Hobbes with a ἄθυμος πρόρρησις [nonspirited address] (*Laws* X [888a])
these popular views are superior to your view in so far as they see that man is not, and cannot be, the measure of all things, μαντεύονται τὴν ἀλήθειαν [divining the truth]; and it is good for them to believe it

Note 14

the δαιμόνιον [daimonion]—connection with consciousness as warner—warns of guilt—but all action is essentially guilty (der Handelnde ist immer gewissenlos)[5] ergo δαιμόνιον [daimonion] warns of all action.

Note 15

The fundamental problem: primacy of gods or primacy of ideas

—primacy of gods → ὅσιον [holy] = θεοφιλές [dear to the gods] → gods love men in a devastating manner
—primacy of ideas → ὅσιον [holy] ≠ θεοφιλές [dear to the gods] → gods do not love men—except perhaps the philosophers
This is somehow connected with the problem of love; the relation of ἕκαστα [particulars] to ideas being ὀρέγεσθαι [desire]: it is a love of the lower for the higher—a love which does not affect the higher.
The examples in 10a5ff.:
1) φέρειν [to carry], ἄγειν [to lead], ὁρᾶν [to see] are actions which do not affect the object
2) φέρειν [to carry] and ἄγειν [to lead] affect the object to the extent that they change its place—φέρειν [to carry] κ. [and] ἄγειν [to lead] = devastating ≠ ὁρᾶν [to see] leaves the object absolutely unchanged
→ love of the lower for the higher has the character of ὁρᾶν [to see]—but what about the love of higher for the lower?
3) ἄγειν [to lead] is central → the higher affects the lower by leading it
ad action: Does S. lead E. out of love? No—then out of ἀνάγκη [necessity]—philosopher takes care of the πόλις [city] ἀναγκασθείς [having been compelled] *Resp.*—yet no ἀνάγκη [necessity] for gods to care for men whom they do not love → the gods love only the θεοφιλές [dear to the gods]—the philosophers (*EN* X)
10cff.—the examples given by S. in 10a5–b are all examples of πάσχειν [to undergo], i.e. of pre-existing things being acted upon—but the ὅσιον [holy] = θεοφιλές [dear to the gods] which E. has in mind comes into being through the gods' loving—whereas the ὅσιον [holy] ≠ θεοφιλές [dear to the gods] (what S. has in mind) is pre-existing and merely acted upon through the gods' loving.
The deeper meaning: the ὅσιον [holy] (= θύειν [to make sacrifices]) is not θεοφιλές [dear to the gods] (if the gods are knowing beings).
ὅσιον [holy] = to do what the gods tell us to do is not what the gods love—if the gods are wise—if there are ideas (φύσις [nature]—*Odyssey* X)
ὅσιον [holy] = to do what the gods tell us to do is what the gods love—if the gods are ignorant masters—if there are no ideas

E. is not certain whether ὅσιον [holy] = or ≠ θεοφιλές [dear to the gods]
PTO [please turn over]

[V]The first explicit definition: ὅσιον [holy] = θεοφιλές [dear to the gods]

a) if there are many gods who fight among each other, it is impossible to be pious while being impious at the same time → E. is likely to lose his lawsuit and E. gets frightened

b) if the gods agree, or if there is only one god, ὅσιον [holy] ≠ θεοφιλές [dear to the gods] (for: wise god would not demand sacrifices etc.) → to do what the gods do requires abandonment of what the gods command → E. gets still more frightened

11b3–4: the absolute primacy of the ideas ≠ the gods' attitude toward the ideas

action— 11b6–8—E. extremely bewildered
11b9—our ancestor—not "our" fault (11b7–8), sc. of E. and S., but of S. and his people—

<S. Daedalus? son of Hephaestus, son of Zeus cf. *Theaet.*—contemporary with *Euthyphron*>

<ὁσιότης [piety] ἐπιστήμη [knowledge]>
<—father: subject of the dialogue>
<πάτριον [ancestral]>

<11c5: τὸ ἄλλο σκῶμμα [another jest]: namely, μαιευτική [midwifery] (Benardete)>

11b9–c6—E. and S. have inverted their roles or changed their places—by this very fact, they have not lost from their συγγένεια [kinship]—they are in the same boat—S. too is impious

11c4–7—in the case of S., the false λόγοι [accounts/arguments] will run away—whereas they are not abandoned by E.—περιέρχεται [move about] (b9) περιιέναι [go about] (c7) 15b10 (S. speaks of E.)

11c—if S. is the descendant of Daedalus, his ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἔργα [deed in speeches] would ἀποδιδράσκει [run away] (*Protagoras* 317a)

11b8—E. becomes suddenly aware of the independent movement of the λόγοι [accounts/arguments]—which is not subject to any human or divine control—

11b8–c6—S. seems to trace this apparently independent movement to human agency—to a τέχνη [art]

11c7–d2—E. accepts S.'s "correction': S. is the λόγου τεχνίτης [the craftsman of the argument]

11d3–e1—no, S. says, the λόγοι [accounts/arguments] really have a movement of their own

[note connecting all comments from 11b8 to 11d3–e1:] Cf. Jascha [Jacob Klein]: are the λόγοι [accounts/arguments] moving by themselves or is this due to the fireworks of the sophist?

To the extent, to which the λόγοι [accounts/arguments] move by themselves, there is no human responsibility, no guilt—but S. wants to warn E.—he has therefore to bring in the possibility of guilt—he makes E. responsible—E. makes S. responsible—S. playful hostility in d3 (ἑταῖρε [fellow]) and e2 (τρυφᾶν [dissipated, sluggish]).[v]

Note 16

1) History of ideas is the account, in chronological order, of the changes in human thought concerning the whole of human life or concerning the whole *tout court*.
History of ideas deserves methodical priority before sociology of ideas or any other explanation of ideas. For one cannot explain a thing before one knows what the thing to be explained is. Interpretation has to precede explanation.
History of ideas deals with human thoughts concerning the whole, and so does history of philosophy. But history of philosophy deals with a particular kind of human thought—viz. methodical thought. Now, methodical thought is less susceptible of arbitrary interpretation than is unmethodical thought: methodical priority of history of philosophy.

2) If the history of ideas is centered around history of philosophy, the question arises: what is the relation of history of philosophy to philosophy itself? What is philosophy? The attempt to replace opinions about the whole by science, or evident knowledge, of the whole. This

means: philosophy itself is a-historical; the question of what this or that individual thought about the world is not a philosophic question. Now, the fundamental difference between history and philosophy was recognized until a short time ago; today we are confronted with a fusion of philosophy and history which makes the distinction between the two increasingly difficult; today, it seems impossible to carry through the distinction between philosophy and history. If one tries to understand this fact, one is eventually driven to assume a fundamental difference between modern thought and pre-modern thought—the difference which accounts for the fusion of philosophy and history in modern thought, and the separation between philosophy and history in pre-modern thought. This means: if we do not take for granted that history of philosophy and history of ideas are important and meaningful human activities, if we try to understand our own doing, we are confronted with the fact that the difference between modern thought and pre-modern thought is of basic importance for the understanding of all our thought.

We have discussed the question of the difference by criticizing [A. J.] Carlyle's and others' thesis that there is no fundamental change in political thought in particular between the Stoics and the French Revolution. We can show that such a difference exists.

3) To establish the fact of that difference and to understand its purport, we have to know the characteristics of pre-modern thought, of pre-modern philosophy: the first example we discussed was Machiavelli. Machiavelli confronts us with a difficulty that is totally absent from the literature of the 19th and 20th centuries. As Mr. [J. W.] Allen puts it, M. "writes between the lines." Hence we have to read between his lines in order to understand him. We have to acquire some knowledge of how he wrote, of his technique of writing, in order to begin to read his works. We have assigned two major reasons for his technique:

a) he writes as a republican under a monarchic government

b) he writes as an unbeliever in a believing world.

As regards the technique of reading, we have said that reading between the lines, far from being arbitrary, is identical with the most exact consideration of every feature of the author's work: a first-rate author leaves nothing to chance.

4) The question of whether and how far these observations apply to pre-modern thought as such.

Pre-modern philosophy: the Aristotelian tradition > Plato > Socrates.
Socrates a turning point: he brought philosophy down from heaven to earth and introduced it into the cities and houses of men; he turned from the universe, from the divine things to the human things.
And he did this for reason of piety: he was the founder of an emphatically pious, 'religious' tradition. Edelstein 207–9.[6]
Yet, Socrates was indicted and condemned and executed for his impiety. Should there be a connection between the emphatically pious presentation of his teaching and the fact of his condemnation? The question is usually not even raised: the prevalent teaching is to minimize the importance of the impiety charge and to assume that Socrates was persecuted for reasons of no fundamental nature.
Xenophon's refutation of the impiety-charge—extremely brief—no quotation of the speech of the accusers—cf. *Mem*. I 1 20, II 1.
Plato's *Apology*—S. did not believe in the gods worshipped by the city of Athens—but this is somewhat disguised by the story of the oracle in Delphi.
This does not mean that Socrates was an atheist, of course—but it certainly means that he was not a martyr for his convictions, a religious zealot. His relation to the public was totally different from that of a religious zealot.

Xen. *Mem*. IV 2, 11–17 Plato's concept of the noble lie
Connection with the essence of philosophy: the attempt to replace opinions by knowledge—but opinion is the element of νόμος [law].
Ar. *Pol.*, p.m. p. 129 f.

Notes

1. A note at the bottom of the page reads: "<cf. parallels in *Phaedrus* etc.>"

2. Fragment of MS with the same title can be found in Leo Strauss Papers, box 18, folder 17, Special Collections, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago. On p. 5 (the outline of the Introduction), Strauss notes that the introduction was written from October 1, 1947 to October 16, 1947.

3. "Omnia . . . quae facta sunt, mutabilia sunt, quia de nihilo facta sunt, id est, non fuerunt, et Deo faciente, sunt, et bona sunt" (All things that are made are mutable because they are made out of nothing, that is, they were not and, God making them, they are and they are good), Saint Augustine, *Incomplete Work Against Julian* V, 60 (PL 45, 1495), in *Augustinus: Contra Iulianum opus imperfectum*, vol. 2, books 4–6 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum), ed. Ernst Kalinka and Michaela Zelzer (Vienna: Hoelder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1974–2004), 272.

4. Added at bottom of page.

5. LS refers to one of Johann Wolfgang Goethe's *Maxims and Reflections*: "Der Handelnde ist immer gewissenlos, es hat niemand Gewissen als der

Betrachtende." (The one who acts is always without conscience; no one has conscience but the one who observes.)

6. Perhaps "Greek Medicine in Its Relation to Religion and Magic," *Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine* 5, no. 3 (March 1937): 201–46.